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STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS IN OCCUPATIONAL
DISEASE CASES: IS LOCKE V. JOHNS-MANVILLE A
VIABLE ALTERNATIVE TO THE DISCOVERY RULE?
The traditional purpose of statutes of limitations in negligence cases
is to protect the defendant from stale claims, old evidence, and lax plain-
tiffs.' Statutes of limitations protect the defendant by allowing the plain-
tiff only a fixed period of time after a certain event has occurred in
which to file suit against the defendant.2 Although statutes of limitations
for negligence actions in general operate on the principle of protection
for the defendant,' they differ among jurisdictions in their form,4 and
consequently, in their impact on the plaintiffs right to maintain suit ver-
sus the defendant's right of repose.5
One major distinguishing feature among statutes of limitations is
the event used to mark the beginning of the running of the statutes.'
Most jurisdictions follow one of three rules in determining the time that
the statute of limitations begins to run.7 In jurisdictions that follow the
negligent act rule, the statute of limitations begins to run when the
defendant allegedly commits a wrongful act.8 Injury rule jurisdictions
1 See Barnes v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 406 F.2d 859, 862 (4th Cir. 1969) (statutes of
limitations are created to protect defendants from non-diligent plaintiffs). See generally W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 144 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
Statutes of limitations protect the defendant, in three ways. First, the statutes serve an
evidentiary purpose by preventing errors by the trier of fact based upon stale or incorrect
evidence. Second, the statutes serve a diligence purpose by encouraging the plaintiff to
bring his suit promptly. Last, the statutes serve a personal certainty purpose by allowing
potential defendants safely to assume that they are free from suit after a reasonable time
period has elapsed. Comment, Occupational Carcinogenesis and the Statute of Limitation:
Resolving Relevant Policy Goals, 10 ENVT'L L. 113, 122-24 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Oc-
cupational Carcinogenesis]. Accord, Kelley, The Discovery Rule for Personal Injury
Statutes of Limitations: Reflections on the British Experience, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 1641,
1644-45 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Kelley].
2 See Occupational Carcinogenesis, supra note 1, at 124-25.
3 See note 1 supra.
See text accompanying notes 7-10 infra (statutes of limitations differ in 'event chosen
to begin running). Personal injury statutes of limitations also differ in length among
jurisdictions. Most statutes run from one to three years. See 4 AM. JuR. TRIALS 600-01
(1966).
5 See text accompanying notes 12-23 infra. The defendant's right to be free from suit
after a reasonable time often is called the defendant's right of repose. See PROSSER, supra
note 1, at 144.
1 Comment, Developments-Statutes of Limitation, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1200-05
(1950) [hereinafter cited as Developments]; see Occupational Carcinogenesis, supra note 1,
at 128 (listing events that mark running of statutes of limitations in occupational- disease
cases).
See Developments, supra note 6, at 1200-05; text accompanying notes 8-10 infra.
' See, e.g., Schwartz v. Heyden Newport Chem. Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 212, -, 188
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disregard the time of the negligent act and begin the statute's running
instead on the date the plaintiff sustained an injury as a result of the
defendant's negligence.' Discovery rule jurisdictions focus on the date
the plaintiff detects either the injury or the injury and the cause of the
harm. 0
The importance of the choice among the three rules is not apparent
in cases in which the negligent act, the injury, and the discovery coincide
since the statute of limitations begins to run at the same time under any
of the rules." When the three events of negligence, injury, and discovery
do not coincide, however, the choice of events to start the statute's run-
ning assumes tremendous significance. 2 Occupational disease cases in
which two or three decades may separate the plaintiffs exposure to the
harmful substance and the development or discovery of the disease illus-
trate the serious consequences to the plaintiff of the choice of statute-
triggering events.'3
N.E.2d 142, 143 (1961), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 808 (1963); Brown v. Tennessee Consol. Coal
Co., 19 Tenn. App. 123, -, 83 S.W.2d 568, 577 (1935).
I See, e.g., Barnes v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 406 F.2d 859, 861 (4th Cir. 1969); Caudill v.
Wise Rambler, Inc., 210 Va. 11, 13; 168 S.E.2d 257, 259 (1969); Plazak v. Allegheny Steel Co.,
324 Pa. 422, 429-30, 188 A. 130, 133 (1936).
10 See, e.g., Daniels v. Beryllium Corp., 211 F. Supp. 452, 456 (E.D. Pa. 1962); Burns v.
Bell, 409 A.2d 614, 616 (D.C. 1979); Harig v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 284 Md. 70, 71, 394
A.2d 299, 300 (1978); Dalton v. Dow Chem. Co., 280 Minn. 147, -, 158 N.W.2d 580, 583
(1968). A majority of states now have some form of discovery rule. 409 A.2d at 616. The
term "discovery rule" does not refer to a single standard. "Discovery rule" encompasses a
group of subtle, but important variations on the point when the discovery statute begins to
run. One variation of the discovery rule refers to the date the plaintiff actually discovered
his injury. See Strickland v. Johns-Manville Int'l. Corp., 461 F. Supp. 215, 217 (S.D. Tex.
1978). Some jurisdictions use the time the plaintiff discovered or should have discovered his
injury to trigger the statute of limitations. E.g., Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 169 (1949);
Burns v. Bell, 409 A.2d at 616; see Novak v. Triangle Steel Co., 197 Neb. 783, -, 251
N.W.2d 158, 160-62 (1977) (emphasizing difference in result between use of "discovered" and
"should have discovered"). A third variation on the discovery rule provides that the statute
of limitations does not begin to run until the plaintiff learns of his injury and of the occupa-
tional nature of his disease. United States Nat'l. Bank v. Davies, 274 Or. 663,-, 548 P.2d
966, 970 (1976). A few courts applying a discovery rule have intimated that statutes of
limitations should begin to run on the date the plaintiff discovers he has a cause of action for
his injury against the defendant. Bridgford v. United States, 550 F.2d 978, 981 (4th Cir.
1977); Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144, 147 (Utah 1979).
" See Developments, supra note 6, at 1200.
1 Id. The issue of when the statute of limitations period begins becomes complex when
considerable time intervenes between the wrongful act and the consequent harm. Id.; see
text accompanying notes 14-23 infra.
10 See 5B LAWYER'S MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA (C. Frankel, ed. 1972) § 38.46h [hereinafter
cited as LAWYER'S MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA] (table listing periods between exposure to harmful
substance and serious development or appearance of disease for several occupational
diseases). Occupational cancers such as mesothelioma and tracheal adenomas generally do
not develop until 10 to 35 years after exposure to the harmful substance. Occupational Car-
cinogenesis, supra note 1, at 115. Other non-cancerous occupational diseases such as
asbestosis and silicosis take from 10 to 25 years to develop fully. See LAWYER'S MEDICAL
CYCLOPEDIA, supra, § 38.46h. The period of time between exposure to a substance and
development of a disease is called the latency period. Id.
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In jurisdictions that follow the negligent act, rule, the statute of
limitations may bar an occupational disease plaintiff from suit long
before his disease first develops. 4 The negligent act of the defendant in
exposing the plaintiff to the harmful substance can take place years
before the disease develops because of the lengthy latency periods for
most occupational diseases.15 The statute of limitations in negligent act
jurisdictions thus may bar a plaintiffs cause of action before the injury,
one of the necessary elements of a negligence cause, exists.16
Occupational disease victims in injury rule jurisdictions may fare
little better than their negligent act rule counterparts. 7 Injury rule
courts have difficulty determining when the injury occurred in occupa-
tional diseases, which usually develop over a long period of time.18 Conse-
quently, rather than try to pinpoint the date the disease developed,
many injury rule jurisdictions have adopted the time of the plaintiff's
last exposure to the harmful substance as the definition .of injury. 9
1, See, e.g., Schwartz v. Heyden Newport Chem. Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 212, 188 N.E.2d 142
(1961) (cause for loss of eye barred because defendant's negligent act occurred long before
plaintiffs consequent loss of eyesight), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 808 (1963); Brown v. Tennessee
Consol. Coal Co., 19 Tenn. App. 123, -, 83 S.W.2d 568, 580 (1935) (cause for silicosis bar-
red before disease developed because of long latency period). Courts originally used the
date of negligence rule to protect defendant manufacturers from liability to avoid hindering
industrial growth. Occupational Carcinogenesis, supra note 1, at 129.
" See note 13 supra.
"' See note 14 supra. Proof of an injury is one of four factors that must be present
before a cause for negligence accrues. See 12A MICHIE'S JURISPRUDENCE, Limitation of Ac-
tions § 23 (1978). The four factors include a legal obligation that the defendant owes to the
plaintiff, a breach of that obligation, negligence by the defendant, and an injury to the plain-
tiff. Id. Statutes of limitations should not begin to run until all four elements of a cause ex-
ist. See PROSSER, supra note 1, at 144. If an occupational disease plaintiff must sue within a
few years after the defendant negligently exposed the plaintiff to a harmful substance, the
plaintiff probably will not have developed the disease or sustained any tangible harm. Thus
the case against the defendant will be difficult or impossible to prove. See note 13 supra.
1 See Augustus v. Republic Steel Corp., 100 F. Supp. 46, 49 (N.D. Ala. 1951) (defining
injury as last exposure barred suit by occupational lung disease plaintiff), rev'd on other
grounds, 200 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1952); Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Co., 270 N.Y.
287, 302, 200 N.E. 824, 828 (1936) (per curiam) (plaintiff barred by last exposure rule before
aware of disease).
S See Occupational Carcinogeness, supra note 1, at 130. See generally Comment,
Asbestos Litigation: The Dust Has Yet to Settle, 7 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 55, 82 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Asbestos Litigation] (not possible to tell with certainty when asbestos
fibers cause injury).
11 See, e.g., Garrett v. Raytheon Co., 368 So.2d 516, 521 (Ala. 1979); Schmidt v. Mer-
chants Despatch Transp. Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 302, 200 N.E. 824, 828 (1936); Plazak v.
Allegheny Steel Co., 324 Pa. 422, 429-30, 188 A. 130, 134 (1936). Courts applying an exposure
theory construe the date of the plaintiff's last exposure as the date of his last employment.
Occupational Carcinogenesis, supra note 1, at 130-31. But see Zimmerer v. General Elec.
Corp., 126 F. Supp. 690, 692-93 (D. Conn. 1954) (time of plaintiff's first exposure to harmful
substance began running of statute of limitations in occupational disease case). The last ex-
posure theory of injury arises from the idea that each new breath of the harmful substance
constitutes a new tort by the detendant. Asbestos Litigation, supra note 18, at 82. The
statute of limitations thus runs from the last breath (exposure) of the harmful substance. Id.
Another variation on the injury rule is the time of disability of the plaintiff. Jeffery
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Because of the possible long lapse of time between exposure and mani-
festation of disease, 0 the victim's disease may not develop in time for
him to maintain suit within the statute of limitations period after expo-
sure to the harmful substance has ended.21
The discovery rule is the most favorable rule for occupational
disease plaintiffs since the statute of limitations in discovery rule jurisdic-
tions does not begin to run until the plaintiff realizes he has contracted
the disease.22 If the plaintiff is diligent in filing suit after he discovers
the disease, he will be able to maintain his action regardless of when the
defendant committed the negligent act or when the plaintiffs last expo-
sure to the substance occurred.23 Because of the inequities that the
negligent act and injury rules work on occupational disease plaintiffs,2
the modern trend in occupational disease cases has been toward the
adoption of the discovery rule to protect the diligent plaintiff.' The
United States Supreme Court expressed a preference for the discovery
rule in a 1949 occupational silicosis case, Urie v. Thompson.' Since Urie,
Stone Co. v. Raulston, 242 Ark. 13, -, 412 S.W.2d 275, 277 (1967). This variation is rather
rare and appears mostly in workmen's compensation cases. See Occupational Car-
cinogenesis, supra note 1, at 133; text accompanying notes 64-67 infra (new interpretation of
injury rule in Virginia).
' See note 13 supra.
21 See note 17 supra (suits barred by exposure rule). Cf. Osborne Mining Co. v. David-
son, 339 S.W.2d 626, 630 (Ky. 1960) (plaintiff who sued immediately after date of last employ-
ment not barred from suit even though he knew of disease long before suit). Osborne points
out the arbitrariness of an exposure rule. In some cases, the statute of limitations bars the
plaintiff before he has contracted a disease. See note 17 supra. In others, like Osborne, a
plaintiff may know of his disease, put off filing suit for several years, and still be able to
maintain suit if he continues working for the same employer. 339 S.W.2d at 630. Contrary to
the purpose underlying statutes of limitations, the Osborne situation encourages non-
diligence in filing suits. See Occupational Carcinogenesis, supra note 1, at 122; note 1 supra.
2 See, e.g., Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 169 (1949); Strickland v. Johns-Manville
Int'l. Corp., 461 F. Supp. 215, 218 (S.D. Tex. 1978); Harig v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 284
Md. 70, 71, 76-77, 394 A.2d 299, 301, 306 (1978). In Urie, Strickland, and Harig, a discovery
rule allowed the occupational disease plaintiffs to maintain suits several years after the
defendants' negligent acts and after the plaintiffs' last exposure to the harmful substances.
337 U.S. at 169; 461 F. Supp. at 218; 284 Md. at 71, 394 A.2d at 301.
1 See note 22 supra (plaintiffs that filed suit immediately after discovery of disease
allowed to maintain suits).
24 See text accompanying notes 14-21 supra.
See Occupational Carcinogenesis, supra note 1, at 136 n.127.
337 U.S. 163 (1949). The Urie plaintiff inhaled silica dust for many years during his
employment with the defendant railroad. Id at 165. The plaintiff did not discover he had
contracted silicosis, a lung disease caused by the inhalation of silica dust, as result of
breathing the dust, for almost thirty years. Id. The plaintiff filed suit against the defendant
shortly after he discovered his injury, but the defendant asserted that the statute of limita-
tions barred the plaintiff's claim. Id at 169. The defendant urged the Supreme Court to ap-
ply an exposure rule that would have barred the plaintiffs claim. Id The Urie Court refused
to apply an exposure rule, however, and stated that in occupational disease cases, a rule
dating the time of the cause accrual as the time the plaintiff discovered or should have
discovered his injury was the only equitable rule to apply. Id at 170. The Court stressed the
possible long lapse of time between exposure to a substance and the manifestation of the
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an increasing number of jurisdictions have turned to an occupational
disease discovery rule to benefit plaintiffs who remain blamelessly ig-
norant of their rights' until long after the defendant's negligent act.'8
These jurisdictions have accepted the policy argument that statutes of
limitations should not bar plaintiffs who diligently file suit within a short
time after they become aware of their injury, even though the defendant
may face liability years after his negligent act. 9
disease. Id. at 169. According to the Court, to adopt a rule other than the discovery rule
would be tantamount to arguing that the plaintiff's blameless ignorance of his injury con-
stituted a waiver of his right to sue. Id. Thus, the Supreme Court refused to allow the
statute of limitations to bar the plaintiff's cause of action before the plaintiff was aware the
cause had accrued. Id. at 171. Because Urie dealt with liability under the Federal
Employer's Liability Act, the case is not binding precedent for state tort actions. Id. at 165.
The Urie court made clear, however, that it considers the discovery rule the preferred rule
in occupational disease cases. Id. at 169; see text accompanying notes 126-32 & 136-39 infra;
Occupational Carcinogenesis, supra note 1, at 152-56 (advantages of discovery rule in oc-
cupational disease cases).
" The phrase "blamelessly ignorant" appears most notably in Urie v. Thompson, 337
U.S. 163, 170 (1949), and has appeared subsequently in a very recent statute of limitations
case. See Woiman v. Gross, 637 F.2d 544, 548 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3278
(Oct. 13, 1981). The phrase "blamelessly ignorant" refers to the plaintiff who does not
discover his injury for some time through no fault of his own, but who may be time-barred
from bringing his suit by strict statutes of limitations. 337 U.S. at 169.
" See note 22 supra (occupational disease cases following discovery rule). Jurisdictions
that follow the discovery rule in occupational disease cases include California, Connecticut,
Kansas, Illinois, Kentucky, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, and Oregon. Annot., 1 A.L.R. 4th
117 (1980). A majority of states now follow a discovery rule in medical malpractice cases.
Burns v. Bell, 409 A.2d 614, 616 (D.C. 1979). Medical malpractice cases are comparable to oc-
cupational disease cases because a malpractice plaintiff, like an occupational disease plain-
tiff, may not be aware of the harm done until years after the defendant's negligent act. See
Hawks v. DeHart, 206 Va. 810, 812, 146 S.E.2d 187, 188 (1966) (plaintiffs action barred
because plaintiff not aware of needle left in neck by surgeon for several years after
surgery).
29 See Strickland v. Johns-Manville Int'l. Corp., 461 F. Supp. 215, 217 (S.D. Tex. 1978)
(blamelessly ignorant occupational disease plaintiff should not be barred from suit by
statute of limitations); United States Nat'l. Bank v. Davies, 274 Or. 663, -, 548 P.2d 966,
969-70 (1976) (statute of limitations should not run until plaintiff learns of harm). See
generally Developments, supra note 6, at 1205.
. Discovery rule proponents point out that a plaintiff-oriented discovery rule furthers
the recognized purposes of statutes of limitations. See note 1 supra. First, a discovery rule
promotes plaintiffs diligence in filing suit. See Asbestos Litigation, supra note 18, at 79. A
plaintiff cannot be diligent in bringing an action until he is aware of his injury. A discovery
rule insures that the statute of limitations will not run until the plaintiff knows of his injury.
See Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 169 (1949). To bar a plaintiff before he is aware of his
injury by the use of a strict negligent act or injury rule does not promote diligence, but
merely penalizes a blamelessly ignorant plaintiff by depriving him of a remedy for his harm.
Asbestos Litigation, supra note 18, at 79.
A discovery rule also may aid in the accuracy of evidence presented to the court on the
questions of harm and damages. See Asbestos Litigation, supra note 18, at 80. The full ex-
tent of harm to the plaintiff in occupational disease cases only may become apparent years
after the plaintiff's exposure to the harmful substance. See note 13 supra (long latency
periods for occupational cancers); note 107 infra (long development periods for certain non-
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Virginia is one of the states whose legislature has not accepted the
arguments in favor of the discovery rule"0 for occupational disease cases."
cancerous pulmonary diseases). The plaintiff in a discovery rule jurisdiction will have to file
suit and thus introduce evidence of his disease only after the manifestation of the disease.
See text accompanying note 10 supra. In contrast, under a negligent act or first exposure
rule, a plaintiff would have to file suit immediately after the defendant's negligent act in
order to preserve his claim for injury regardless of the lack of any overt physical damage.
See text accompanying notes 14-16 supra. In a jurisdiction following time of last exposure,
the plaintiff would have to file suit immediately after he quit work, again regardless of the
lack of physical damage. See text accompanying notes 19-21 supra. The extent of injuries
that the negligent exposure to the harmful substance caused would be entirely speculative.
See Brief for Appellant at 15-16, Locke v. Johns-Manville Corp., 221 Va. 951, 275 S.E.2d 900
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellant]. Even if the court allowed a suit with no
evidence of tangible damage, these plaintiffs could recover at most for the increased risk of
contracting an occupational cancer or disease. See Asbestos Litigation, supra note 18, at 63
(brief exposure to asbestos increases risk of cancer); Developments, supra note 6, at 1201
(evidence of harm usually necessary to maintain negligence suit). In fact, most asbestos
workers never contract an occupational disease. See LAWYER'S MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA, supra
note 13, § 38.65a (one in five current and former asbestos workers probably will die from
lung cancer; one in ten will die of cancer of gastrointestinal tract; one in twenty will die of
malignant mesothelioma). These suits by exposed plaintiffs would waste court time and
result in incomplete recovery for plaintiffs that later did contract a disease. Cf. Note, The
Application of the Statute of Limitations to Actions for Tortious Radiation Exposure: Gar-
rett v. Raytheon Co., 31 ALA. L. REV. 509, 515-16 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Radiation Ex-
posure] (discussing similar proof problems of exposure rule in occupational disease context).
Finally, discbvery rule adherents argue that most occupational disease defendants are
not entitled to the freedom from suit that statutes of limitations provide. See Asbestos
Litigation, supra note 18, at 79-80; Developments, supra note 6, at 1205. Discovery rule pro-
ponents maintain that manufacturers of harmful substances have been aware of the
possibility of injury to workers for years and should be prepared to litigate claims
whenever the consequences of their negligence appear. Asbestos Litigation, supra note 18,
at 80. Potential occupational disease defendants also carry insurance to deal with harm to
workers from deleterious substances and are thus best equipped to bear the financial
burden of injury. See Occupational Carcinogenesis, supra note 1, at 124.
Arguments against the discovery rule traditionally emphasize the role of statutes of
limitations as provisions of repose for defendants. See Hawks v. DeHart, 206 Va. 810, 814,
146 S.E.2d 187, 189 (1966) (plaintiff's ignorance of rights did not create discovery rule excep-
tion to strict statute of limitations that protect defendant). Opponents of the discovery rule
also argue that the discovery rule is unmanageable because it requires the jury to make a
subjective determination of when the plaintiff should have discovered his injury. See Com-
ment, Accrual of Statutes of Limitations: California's Discovery Exceptions Swallow the
Rule, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 106, 116 (1980) [hereinafter cited as California's Discovery Excep-
tions]; text accompanying notes 129-32 infra. A recent argument against the discovery rule
stresses the increase in manufacturers' insurance rates as a result of plaintiff-oriented
discovery rules. See Comment, Limiting Liability: Products Liability and a Statute of
Repose, 32 BAYLOR L. REV. 137, 143-44 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Limiting Liability]. A re-
cent decision increasing the scope of insurer's liability for occupational disease cases sup-
ports the insurance argument. See Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., No. 81-1179
(D.C. Cir. Oct. 1, 1981). Courts, however, normally cite the failure of their state's legislature
to adopt a discovery rule rather than the increase in insurance rates as their reason for
refusing to apply a discovery rule. See Asbestos Litigation, supra note 18, at 78.
See note 29 supra.
SI See Large v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 524 F. Supp. 285, 289 (E.D. Va. 1981); Locke v. Johns-
Manville Corp., 221 Va. 951, 275 S.E.2d 900, 905 (1981); Street v. Consumer Mining Corp.,
185 Va. 561, 566, 39 S.E.2d 271, 272 (1946).
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Virginia courts32 follow a two year statute of limitations for personal
injury cases that begins to run from the date of injury to the plain-
tiff.13 The Virginia Supreme Court recently faced the-task of applying
the potentially inequitable injury rule3 to an occupational disease case,
Locke v. Johns-Manville Corp.,3 in which three-decades separated the
first negligent act by the defendant and the plaintiffs discovery of the
resultant disease.
In Locke, the plaintiff suffered repeated exposure to asbestos dust
from the defendant's insulation products in the course of his employment
as an electrical technician from 1948 to 1977.3' From 1972 to 1977, Locke
enjoyed excellent health with no visible signs of respiratory or other
ailments. On November 1, 1977, Locke experienced chest pains and
sought medical attention,39 but chest x-rays taken as late as April 14,
1978, were normal. 4' Additional x-rays taken on May 22, 1978, however,
showed an "abnormality" in the lungs, and surgery in June led to a
diagnosis of malignant mesothelioma." Locke filed suit in July 1978
References in this note to Virginia courts mean the Virginia Supreme Court, federal
district courts, and federal circuit courts of appeals applying Virginia law.
VA. CODE§ 8.01-230. Section 8.01-243 of the Virginia Code provides that plaintiffs
must bring personal injury actions within two years from the time the cause accrued. VA.
CODE § 8.01-243. Section 8.01-230 of the Code provides that the cause of action shall accrue,
and the limitation period shall run, from the date the plaintiff sustains injury. VA. CODE §
8.01-230; see Barnes v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 406 F.2d 859, 862 (4th Cir. 1969); Sides v.
Richard Mach. Works, Inc., 406 F.2d 445, 446 (4th Cir. 1969); Caudill v. Wise Rambler, Inc.,
210 Va. 11, 13,168 S.E.2d 257, 258 (1969). Barnes, Sides, and Caudill formally adopted the in-
jury rule in Virginia statute of limitations cases before the Virginia General Assembly
codified the rule in the above statutes. 406 F.2d at 862; 406 F.2d at 446; 210 Va. at 13, 168
S.E.2d at 258.
Some pre-1969 Virginia personal injury statute of limitations cases indicated that the
plaintiff's cause accrued at the time of the negligent act. See Hawks v. DeHart, 206 Va. 810,
813, 146 S.E.2d 187,189 (1966); Street v. Consumer Mining Corp., 185 Va. 561, 566, 39 S.E.2d
271, 272 (1946). Although the Virginia courts have not overruled expressly cases like Hawks
that follow the negligent act rule, the injury rule is now the law of the state. See VA. CODE §
8.01-230. Consequently, attorneys must cite negligent act rule cases like Hawks with care to
avoid the negligent act language. See Brief for Appellee at 7, Locke v. Johns-Manville
Corp., 221 Va. 951, 275 S.E.2d 900 (1981) (incorrect use of Hawks).
u See text accompanying notes 17-21 supra.
221 Va. 951, 275 S.E.2d 900 (1981).
Id. at 954, 275 S.E.2d at 902.
Id, 275 S.E.2d at 902. The asbestos industry has had warnings of the hazard of
asbestos to workers since the 1930's. Asbestos Litigation, supra note 18, at 80. In fact,
asbestos-related personal injury actions have outnumbered other dangerous substance
cases in civil litigation outside the scope of worknien's compensation. LAWYER'S MEDICAL
CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 13, § 38.65a.
221 Va. at 954, 275 S.E.2d at 902.
Id., 275 S.E.2d at 902.
Id., 275 S.E.2d at 902. -
41 Id., 275 S.E.2d at 902. Malignant mesothelioma is a cancerous tumor in the chest,
lungs, or abdomen resulting from exposure to asbestos. Asbestos Litigation, supra note 18,
at 58. Mesothelioma is always fatal, usually within three to eighteen months after the onset
of symptoms. 221 Va. at 955, 275 S.E.2d at 903. Mesothelioma has a latency period of up to
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against eight manufacturers that supplied his employers with asbestos
insulation materials.42 Locke alleged that the defendants were negligent
in failing to warn him of the dangers of asbestos and in failing to test the
safety of the insulation material." Locke further contended that the
defendants breached express and implied warranties by selling unsafe
products and by failing to label the asbestos materials in the proper man-
ner.44 Locke asserted that, as a result of the defendants' negligence and
breach of warranty, Locke inhaled harmful asbestos fibers that caused
him to contract a fatal disease."
The plaintiff's most recent exposure to asbestos occurred over five
years before he filed suit." Consequently; the defendants pled Virginia's
two year statute of limitations for personal injury claims. The defen-
dants later moved for summary judgment on the ground that the action
was not timely.48 After consideration of the plaintiff's depositions and
written proffers of medical evidence, the trial court granted the motion
for summary judgment in November 1978."1 Locke appealed the adverse
order to the Virginia Supreme Court.
The Virginia Supreme Court stated that the crucial issue in the case
was determining the date the plaintiff allegedly sustained injury from
the asbestos dust." Locke argued that he did not have a legally provable
injury before late 1977 or early 1978 when the disease appeared in tangi-
ble form.2 Locke maintained that his injury was the cancer itself, not the
exposure to the asbestos dust over several years. 3 Locke argued that he
could not have maintained an action before he had medical evidence of
his disease because he could not have proven he was injured.' Finally,
35 years in some cases. Occupational Carcinogenesis, supra note 1, at 115. See generally
note 13 supra.
,2 221 Va. at 954, 275 S.E.2d at 902. Locke decided to sue the insulation manufacturers
in a civil personal injury action. Workers that have contracted an occupational disease nor-
mally have two choices for monetary recovery. Occupational Carcinogenesis, supra note 1,
at 121. They may sue for workmen's compensation under the applicable state statutes, or
they may sue the manufacturer or seller of the product for damages. Id
'3 221 Va. at 955, 275 S.E.2d at 903.
Id., 275 S.E.2d at 903.
Id., 275 S.E.2d at 903.
, Id- at 954, 275 S.E.2d at 902.
" Id. at 953, 275 S.E.2d at 902; see note 33 supra (Virginia's two year personal injury
statute of limitations period).
221 Va. at 953,'275 S.E.2d at 902.
Id., 275 S.E.2d at 902.
Id, 275 S.E.2d at 902. Although Locke died before the Virginia Supreme Court heard
his appeal, the court proceeded as though the death had not occurred. Id at 954,275 S.E.2d at
902 n.1.
51 Id. at 958-59, 275 S.E.2d at 904.
Id at 954, 275 S.E.2d at 902; Brief for Appellant, supra note 29, at 14-18.
5 221 Va. at 956, 275 S.E.2d at 903; Brief for Appellant, supra note 29, at 26; see text
accompanying notes 9 & 17-21 supra (discussing exposure theory interpretation of injury).
14 221 Va. at 956, 275 S.E.2d at 903; see note 16 supra. The Locke plaintiff proffered
medical evidence to show that a tumor caused by asbestos normally does not develop for
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Locke stressed that statutes of limitations should not bar rights before
the rights accrue, but should only bar causes of action-after a reasonable
time has elapsed in which to bring s'uit.5 Because the defendants' defini-
tion of injury as exposure to the harmful substance would bar most
causes of action before injury occurred,' Locke contended that the
defendants' position was unjust, inequitable, and contrary to legislative
intent.57
The defendants in Locke argued that the trial court was correct in
ruling that the latest possible date of injury was Locke's last exposure to
the asbestos in 1 9 7 2 .1 According to the defendants, Locke's "injurious
events" were his repeated exposures to the dust over the years of his
employment, not the appearance of the cancerous tumor. 9 The defen-
dants maintained that their alleged breaches of duties to warn and test
coincided with the injurious events, rather than with the development of
the injury, and that the two year statute of limitations thus barred
Locke's suit." Finally, the defendants asserted that Locke's proposed
definition of injury as the manifestation of the tumor was tantamount to
asking for judicial adoption of a discovery rule. 1
The Virginia Supreme Court accepted Locke's argument and held
that the plaintiff had filed suit within the statute of limitations period.2
The court reversed the trial court's decision for summary judgment and
remanded the case for further proceedings on the merits.' In so ruling, the
Virginia Supreme Court expressly held that the statutory term "injury"
means positive physical or mental hurt to the plaintiff, not just a legal
wrong or invasion of the plaintiff's interests." The supreme court indi-
cated that the trial court was to determine the time of the hurt from
medical evidence that would pinpoint most clearly the date of the
injury. 5 From the scant evidence before it, the supreme court speculated
that Locke sustained his injury either when his symptoms first appeared
quite some time after exposure and that not all people exposed to asbestos develop any
asbestos-related disease. 221 Va. at 958, 275 S.E.2d at 905. Thus, the plaintiff argued that he
could not have proven a medical injury, cancer, before the manifestation of the tumor.
0 221 Va. at 956, 275 S.E.2d at 903; Brief for Appellant, supra note 29, at 14.
" See text accompanying notes 19-21 supra.
1, Brief for Appellant, supra note 29, at 27.
0' 221 Va. at 956, 275 S.E.2d at 903.
" Id, 275 S.E.2d at 904.
61 d., 275 S.E.2d at 904.
61 Id, 275 S.E.2d at 904. In his brief, Locke denied that he was urging the court to adopt a
discovery rule and stated that he merely was advocating a definition of injury that focused on
the manifestation of the tumor. Brief for Appellant, supra note 29, at 27.
11 221 Va. at 958-59, 275 S.E.2d at 905.
" Id. at 962, 275 S.E.2d at 907.
Id at 957, 275 S.E.2d at 904. In using the phrase "positive physical or mental hurt",
the Locke court tried to distinguish between a tangible injury such as a tumor, and a legal
invasion of rights, such as the negligent exposure to a harmful chemical. Id, 275 S.E.2d at
904.
,3 221 Va. at 959, 275 S.E.2d at 905.
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in 1977 or when the abnormality appeared on the x-rays in May 1978.8
The court noted, however, that it had not adopted a discovery rule for
personal injury statute of limitations cases in Virginia.7
In construing the statutory term "injury", the Locke court relied on
four Virginia cases dealing with statutes of limitations in both personal
injury and property damage situations. 8 The court used the cases to
demonstrate that a cause of action cannot accrue until the plaintiff's in-
jury exists and can be proven." According to the four cases, the statute
of limitations cannot run until the plaintiff sustains a recognizable injury
and a cause of action thus accrues.10 The Locke court then distinguished
four other Virginia cases that the defendants cited which hold that the
term "injury" refers to the first incidence of harm to the plaintiff, not to
later, consequential damages flowing from the original hurt.7 1 The court
" Id., 275 S.E.2d at 905. The Locke court based its speculation of when Locke's injury
occurred on mere allegations by the plaintiff of what the plaintiff intended to prove at trial.
Id. at 954, 275 S.E.2d at 902. The court concluded that only the medical evidence at trial
would allow a complete determination of when the injury occurred. Id
" 221 Va. at 959, 275 S.E.2d at 905-06. To support its statement that the Locke opinion
did not adopt a discovery rule, the Locke court hypothesized that a doctor could testify at
trial that in certain occupational disease 'ases the disease existed long before the plaintiff
experienced symptoms or otherwise discovered his disease. Id, 275 S.E.2d at 905. The
statute of limitations would run then from the date the disease developed, even if it barred
the plaintiff, and not from the time of plaintiffs awareness of harm. Id., 275 S.E.2d at 906;
see text accompanying notes 114-132 infra (whether Locke court adopted a discovery rule).
" Barnes v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 406 F.2d 859 (4th Cir. 1969) (negligence action for
personal injuries caused by defective bicycle); Sides v. Richard Mach. Works, Inc., 406 F.2d
445 (4th Cir. 1969) (negligence action for personal injuries sustained when industrial
locomotive derailed); Caudill v. Wise Rambler Inc., 210 Va. 11, 168 S.E.2d 257 (1969) (warran-
ty action for personal injuries from crash caused by defective car); Louisville & N. R.R. v.
Saltzer, 151 Va. 165, 144 S.E. 456 (1928) (negligence action for property damage to plaintiffs
lands caused by railroad company's change in flow of river).
69 221 Va. at 957-58, 275 S.E.2d at 904-05; see Barnes v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 406 F.2d
859, 862 (4th Cir. 1969) (plaintiff not harmed by defective bicycle until physical injury sus-
tained); Sides v. Richard Mach. Works, Inc., 406 F.2d 445, 447 (4th Cir. 1969) (plaintiff not
harmed by defective locomotive until physical injury occurred); Caudill v. Wise Rambler
Inc., 210 Va. 11, 13, 168 S.E.2d 257, 259 (1969) (plaintiff not harmed by defectively designed
car until physical injury to plaintiff occurred); Louisville & N. R.R. v. Saltzer, 151 Va. 165,
169, 144 S.E. 456, 458 (1928) (land not harmed by change in flow in river until flooding occur-
red).
. 221 Va. at 958-59, 275 S.E.2d at 905; see Barnes v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 406 F.2d
859, 862 (4th Cir. 1969); Sides v. Richard Mach. Works, Inc., 406 F.2d 445, 447 (4th Cir. 1969);
Caudill v. Wise Rambler Inc., 210 Va. 11, 13, 168 S.E.2d 257, 258 (1969); Louisville & N. R.R.
v. Saltzer, 151 Va. 165, 169, 144 S.E. 456, 458 (1928).
"' 221 Va. at 961-62, 275 S.E.2d at 907; Comptroller of Va. ex. reL Va. Mil. Inst. v. King,
217 Va. 751, 232 S.E.2d 895 (1977) (defective architectural design was initial harm to building
and subsequent water damage was consequential damage); Hawks v. DeHart, 206 Va. 810,
146 S.E.2d 187 (1966) (surgeon's leaving needle in plaintiff's neck was original harm and
subsequent pain was consequential damage); Richmond Redev. & Hous. Auth. v. Laburnum
Constr. Corp., 195 Va. 827, 80 S.E.2d 574 (1954) (defective installation of pipeline was
original harm and subsequent explosion was consequential damage); Street v. Consumers
Mining Corp., 185 Va. 561, 39 S.E.2d 271 (1946) (initial development of disease was initial
harm and subsequent increase in severity of symptoms was consequential damage).
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insisted that in the latter four cases the plaintiffs had sustained injuries
at an early date, even though they did not discover the injuries until
later, more serious damages appeared as a direct result of the original
harm.72 The Locke court pointed out, in contrast, that Locke's injury was
not complete until the tumor developed.73 The court reasoned that the
plaintiffs ongoing contact with the harmful asbestos was not the original
injury and that the tumor was, therefore, not a mere consequential
damage resulting from the original harm.74 Thus Locke's injury, and not
just his discovery of the consequences of his injury, occurred within two
years before he filed suit.
75
In Locke, the Virginia Supreme Court appeared to face a choice, be-
tween an application of the exposure interpretation of the injury rule
and judicial adoption of a discovery rule.7" A strict date of last exposure
221 Va. at 961-62, 275 S.E.2d at 906-07. The Locke court satisfactorily distinguished
two of the defendants' four cases, Hawks v. DeHart, 206 Va. 810, 146 S.E.2d 187 (1966) and
Street v. Consumers Mining Corp., 185 Va. 561, 39 S.E.2d 271 (1946). Id., 275 S.E.2d at 907.
In Hawks, a surgeon negligently left in the plaintiff's neck a needle that she did not discover
for sixteen years. 206 Va. at 811, 812, 146 S.E.2d at 187, 188 (1966). The Hawks court held
that the plaintiffs suit, filed one year after discovery of the injury, was untimely, because
the plaintiff suffered an injury when the needle Was left in sixteen years prior to discovery.
206 Va. at 812-13, 146 S.E.2d at 189-90. The Hawks court defined injury as the date the nee-
dle was left in the plaintiffs neck and suggested that, had she known of the injury, the
Hawks plaintiff could have sued immediately for negligence. 206 Va. at 813, 146 S.E.2d at
189. The Iocke court distinguished Hawks on the ground that the needle had injured the
Hawks plaintiff on the earlier date, but the plaintiff had not discovered her injury until
much later. 221 Va. at 961-62, 275 S.E.2d at 907. The Locke plaintiff, on the other hand, was
not injured until a later date, when his tumor first appeared. 221 Va. at 958-59, 215 S.E.2d at
.905.
The Locke court distinguished Street, an earlier occupational disease case, on the
basis of factual evidence in Street that showed that the silicosis of which the plaintiff com-
plained had developed ten to fifteen years prior to suit. 185 Va. at 565, 39 S.E.2d at 272. In
Locke, the plaintiff proffered medical evidence that suggested the tumor developed shortly
before the plaintiff filed suit. 221 Va. at 954-55, 275 S.E.2d at 902-03.
The remaining two cases that the Locke court analyzed, Richmond Redev. & Hous.
Auth. v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 195 Va. 827, 80 S.E.2d 574 (1954), and Comptroller of Va.
ex. rel. Va. Mil. Inst. v. King, 217 Va. 751, 232 S.E.2d 895 (1977), pose a greater problem for
the court. By analogy, these cases could have justified the Locke court's adoption of an ex-
posure rule. See text accompanying notes 85-87 infra. Laburnum and King represent the
idea that once a thing has incurred even a small amount of damage, the cause accrues and
the statute of limitations begins to run. 217 Va. at 759, 232 S.E.2d at 900; 195 Va. at 838-39,
80 S.E.2d at 581. Consequential damages are unimportant. See note 71 supra. The Locke
court did not explain why Locke's initial exposure to asbestos dust was not the initial harm
and the tumor merely a consequential damage. See note 87 infra.
" 221 Va. at 959, 275 S.E.2d at 905-06.
"' Id. at 959, 275 S.E.2d at 906.
75 Id. at 962, 275 S.E.2d at 907.
71 See California's Discovery Exceptions, supra note 29, at 124; text accompanying
notes 17-21 supra (discussing exposure theory). Injury rule courts generally have two
choices in occupational disease cases, strict exposure interpretation of an injury rule or
judicial adoption of a discovery rule. California's Discovery Exceptions, supra note 29, at
124. Virginia courts repeatedly have refused to adopt a discovery rule in the absence of
legislative action, even in the face of inequities to plaintiffs. See, e.g., Barnes v. Sears,
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rule would have barred the Locke plaintiff from suit since his last expo-
sure to the asbestos dust occurred five years before he discovered his in-
jury,7" but would have protected the defendants' right of repose. 8
Judicial adoption of a discovery rule would have allowed the plaintiff to
maintain suit,79 but would have usurped the lawmaking function of the
Virginia legislature. 0 The Locke court avoided both unattractive alter-
natives by defining the statutory term injury as manifestation of the
tumor, thereby rendering a positive result for the plaintiff.8'
In defining the term injury as tumor manifestation in order to
benefit the plaintiff, the Locke court ignored impressive medical, and
legal authority that would have supported an exposure interpretation of
injury.82 Several jurisdictions have adopted a date of exposure theory in
Roebuck & Co., 406 F.2d 859, 862-63 (4th Cir. 1969) (court refused to adopt discovery rule in
hidden defect products liability case); Morgan v. Schlanger, 374 F.2d 235, 239 (4th Cir. 1967)
(court noted injustice of injury rule to malpractice plaintiff but refused to adopt discovery
rule in medical malpractice case).
See 221 Va. at 954, 275 S.E.2d at 902.
"' See text accompanying note 5 supra. Under a date of last exposure rule, a defen-
dant would be certain of freedom from suit by an occupational disease plaintiff two or three
years after the plaintiffs employment with the defendant ended. See note 19 & text accom-
panying notes 19-21 supra.
"' See 221 Va. at 954, 275 S.E.2d at 902. The Locke plaintiff brought suit within one
month after he discovered the nature of his disease. Id., 275 S.E.2d at 902.
o See note 76 supra (Virginia courts opposed to judicial legislation).
221 Va. at 958, 275 S.E.2d at 905.
The Locke court in effect manipulated the term "injury" by rejecting an exposure
interpretation of injury that carried much supporting medical and legal authority and
creating its own new definition of injury in order to reach a favorable result for the plaintiff.
See 221 Va. at 958-59, 275 S.E.2d at 906. A California commentator has used the phrase
"manipulation of the term 'date of injury"' to describe a California court's reasoning in an
occupational disease case similar to Locke. See California's Discovery Exceptions, supra
note 29, at 109. In Associated Indem. Corp. v. State Indus. Accident Comm'n, the California
District Court of Appeals faced the problem of a silicosis plaintiffs suing years after his
first exposure to the harmful substance. 124 Cal. App. 378, -, 12 P.2d 1075, 1077 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1932). Silicosis is an occupational pulmonary disease that takes several years to
develop after inhalation of silica dust. LAWYER'S MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 13, §
33.48a. The California court dealt with an injury rule similar to Virginia's. 124 Cal. App. at
-, 12 P.2d at 1077. In order to allow the plaintiffs suit, the court defined injury as the
time when the accumulated effects of the deleterious substance manifested. Id. Rather than
adopt a discovery rule outright, the court "manipulated" the time of injury to reach a ver-
dict for the plaintiff. California's Discovery Exceptions, supra note 29, at 109.
The Locke and Associated Indemnity courts' opinions are plaintiff-oriented in that both
courts reached favorable results for the plaintiff by creating their own definitions of injury.
221 Va. 951, 961, 275 S.E.2d 900, 905-07; 124 Cal. App. 378, -, 12 P.2d 1075, 1077. The
courts' actions are plaintiff-oriented in that they shift the focus of the event that triggers the
statute of limitations to the plaintiff rather than the defendant. 221 Va. at 957, 275 S.E.2d at
904. Under an exposure rule, the focus is on the defendant's negligent act of exposing the
plaintiff to a harmful substance. See notes 17-21 supra. In contrast, a manifestation of
disease rule focuses on the effect of the substance on the plaintiff and disregards the defen-
dant's negligent act. 221 Va. at 957, 275 S.E.2d at 904. The Locke and Associated Indemnity
manifestation rules thus suggest a shift away from the traditional emphasis on the defen-
dant and his right to repose after his negligent act. See text accompanying note 1 supra. In
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asbestos related cases based on medical evidence showing that the body
sustains injury when the victim breathes the asbestos fibers and the
fibers settle into his lungs." Irritation of the lungs can occur after the
first intake of asbestos dust, long before a specific disease develops.84
The Locke court also could have relied on Virginia property damage case
law, which indirectly would support a ruling that the plaintiff sustained
harm at the time of his exposure to the dust and not at the time of
manifestation of the tumor. 5 Virginia property damage law defines injury
as the first occurrence of harm, not as the date on which consequential
damages appear.88 The court could have reasoned by analogy that Locke
sustained injury after his first intake of asbestos dust, and that the
subsequent disease was a mere consequential damage of the initial
harm.1
7
their focus on the plaintiff, the Locke and Associated Indemnity rules resemble a discovery
rule, which emphasizes the plaintiff's awareness of harm rather than the defendant's
negligent act. See note 10 supra. But see text accompanying notes 96-120 infra (discussing'
differences between Lbcke rule and discovery rule).
" See note 19 supra. Jurisdictions that have used an exposure rule in occupational
disease cases include Connecticut, Indiana, Louisiana, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Ten-
nessee. Annot., 1 A.L.R. 4th 117 (1980).
' See Asbestos Litigation, supra note 18; at 63.
See notes 86-87 infra.
See Comptroller of Va. v. King, e. reL. Va. Mil. Inst., 217 Va. 751, 759, 232 S.E.2d
895, 900 (1977); Richmond Redev. & Hous. Auth. v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 195 Va. 827,
838-39, 80 S.E.2d 574, 581 (1954); Louisville & N. R.R. Co. v. Saltzer, 151 Va. 165, .170-71, 144
S.E. 456, 457 (1928). In Saltzer, a case involving property damage caused by a change in the
flow of a river, the Virginia Supreme Court stated that whenever a plaintiff incurs any in-
jury, however slight, as a result of the defendant's action the cause of action then accrues.
151 Va. at 170-71, 144 S.E. at 457, quoted in Locke v. Johns-Manville Corp., 221 Va. at 960,
275 S.E.2d at 906. Once a cause has accrued from a slight injury, the date of further, more
substantial injury becomes unimportant. 151 Va. at 170-71, 144 S.E. at 457.
Virginia courts have reaffirmed the idea of the insignificance of consequential damages
in two recent property damage cases, Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Authority v.
Laburnum Construction Corp., supra, and Comptroller of Virginia ex. reL. Virginia Military
Institute v. King, supra. In Laburnum, the defendant negligently installed a gas pipeline in
the plaintiff's building. 195 Va. at 829-30, 80 S.E.2d at 576. The pipeline exploded several
years later, damaging the building extensively. Id. at 830, 80 S.E.2d at 576. The court held
that the injury had been done to the building at the time of negligent pipeline installment
and that the subsequent explosion was only a consequential damage from the original harm.
Id. at 838-39, 80 S.E.2d at 581. The Laburnum court noted that the plaintiffs difficulty in
ascertaining the injury warranted no exception to the general injury rule. Id. at 838, 80
S.E.2d at 581.
In King, the plaintiffs building suffered external water damage as a result of the
defendant architect's defective plans for the building. 217 Va. at 756, 232 S.E.2d at 898. The
court, again relying on the idea of consequential damages, held that the injury occurred
when the defective building plans were approved and not when the building developed the
water damage. Id. at 759, 232 S.E.2d at 900. In both Laburnum and King, the court deemed
the statute of linitations to run from the original injury and not from the time of the later
damage. Id., 232 S.E.2d at 900; 195 Va. at 839, 80 S.E.2d at 581.
I See text accompanying notes 83 & 84 supra (lungs injured when victim breathes
asbestos dust). The Locke court could have ruled that the initial irritation of the plaintiff's
lungs constituted the original injury and that the subsequent scarring or cancer of the lungs
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The strong plaintiff-orientation inherent in the Locke court's choice
of a manifestation of tumor theory over a well-supported exposure
theory prompted the Locke defendants to charge that the court had
adopted a camaflaged discovery rule." The Locke court's dictum, which
closely links the dates of the plaintiffs symptoms and diagnosis of the
disease with the date the statute of limitations would begin to run, sup-
ports the defendants' contention. 9 Discovery rule courts frequently use
the date of the plaintiff's symptoms or diagnosis of illness to pinpoint the
date of the plaintiff's discovery of his disease. The fact that Locke is the
most recent case in a decade-long liberalization of Virginia personal injury
statute of limitations law further supports the defendants' argument."
was merely a consequence of the original injury. By applying the consequential damages
reasoning, the Locke court then could have found that the time of injury was the date of ex-
posure to the fibers, rather than the date of manifestation of the disease.
The Locke court did not mention the analogy between occupational disease cases and
consequential damage property cases that could have supported an exposure theory of in-
jury. Perhaps the court felt that Virginia's five year statute of limitations for property
damage cases adequately protects property plaintiffs, but that personal injury plaintiffs like
Locke need greater protection. See VA. CODE § 8.01-243(B) (five year statute of limitations
for property cases). The court also may have decided that property damage cases were inap-
propriate precedent for personal injury, occupational disease cases. The Locke court did,
however, explain briefly its general rejection of an exposure rule in occupational disease
cases. 221 Va. at 955, 275 S.E.2d at 903. The court explained that the dates of the plaintiffs
exposures to the asbestos fibers bore no medical relationship to when or if the plaintiff
would contract mesothelioma. Id. The court may have noted from the plaintiff's brief the
unintentional result that a time of exposure rule could bring in occupational disease cases.
See note 29 supra; Brief for Appellant, supra note 29, at 15-16. Although most exposed
workers never contract an occupational disease, they would feel obligated to file suit after
exposure to the harmful substance in order to preserve their suit, perhaps by claiming an
increased risk of cancer due to their exposure. See note 29 supra. If allowed, the suits would
either result in windfalls for plaintiffs that never contracted a disease or in incomplete
recovery for plaintiffs that subsequently did develop occupational diseases. Id. Most courts
would not allow the suits for cancer risk, since the plaintiff could not prove a tangible injury
until the disease developed. Id.
221 Va. at 959, 275 S.E.2d at 905.
" Id., 275 S.E.2d at 905 (date of Locke's injury coincided with either date of symptoms
or date of diagnosis).
" See, e.g., Karjala v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 523 F.2d 155, 160-61 (8th Cir. 1975)
(date of symptoms and diagnosis as time of plaintiff's discovery for statute of limitations
purposes); Ricciuti v. Voltare Tubes, Inc., 277 F.2d 809, 812 (2nd Cir. 1960) (date of diagnosis
as time of plaintiff's discovery for statute of limitations purposes); McCoy v. Johns-Manville,
No. 81-136 (D.D.C. Dec. 31, 1981) (statute of limitations runs from date of diagnosis).
91 The first indication of a liberalization trend in Virginia personal injury statute of
limitations law occurred in three 1969 products liability cases. See Barnes v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 406 F.2d 859 (4th Cir. 1969); Sides v. Richard Mach. Works, Inc., 406 F.2d 445 (4th Cir.
1969); Caudill v. Wise Rambler Inc., 210 Va. 11, 168 S.E.2d 257 (1969). Barnes, Sides, and
Caudill involved the negligent sale of defective products that eventually caused personal in-
juries to the plaintiffs. 406 F.2d at 860; 406 F.2d at 446; 210 Va. at 11, 168 S.E.2d at 258. The
Barnes, Sides, and Caudill defendants argued that the plaintiffs sustained injury on the
dates of the sales of the defective products and that the statute of limitations thus should
begin to run on the dates of the sales. 406 F.2d at 862; 406 F.2d at 446; 210 Va. at 12, 168
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The court's choice of manifestation over exposure,92 in conjunction with
the discovery rule dictum93 and the personal injury liberalization trend,94
raises the issue of whether the Locke court in effect adopted a discovery
rule for occupational disease cases.
Although the Locke rule yields the same equitable result for the
plaintiff that a discovery rule would yield on the same facts,95 the Locke
court was correct in the assertion that it did not adopt an occupational
disease discovery rule. The two rules fundamentally differ in their
theoretical focal points. Whereas the Locke rule focuses on the time that
the plaintiff contracts his disease, an event beyond the plaintiff's
control,97 a discovery rule stresses the plaintiff's diligence in filing suit
after he is aware of his injury. The Locke rule tries to insure that all
the technical requirements of a cause of action, including injury, are pre-
sent before the statute of limitations runs.9 In addition to insuring that
S.E.2d at 259. Because the plaintiffs in all three cases brought suit more than two years
after the sale of the products, the defendants asserted that Virginia's two year personal in-
jury statute of limitations barred the plaintiffs' claims. 406 F.2d at 862; 406 F.2d at 446; 210'
Va. at 12, 168 S.E.2d at 259. The courts disagreed with the defendants, however, and split
the defendants' negligent acts of selling defective goods into two causes of action in order to
allow the plaintiffs to maintain suit. 406 F.2d at 862; 406 F.2d at 446; 210 Va. at 13, 168
S.E.2d at 259. The courts stated that the sale of the defective products gave the plaintiffs
immediate causes of action for property damage to the products. 406 F.2d at 862; 406 F.2d at
446; 210 Va. at 13, 168 S.E.2d at 259. The sales of the defective products, however, also gave
rise to potential tort actions that accrued when the plaintiffs sustained physical harm as a
result of the defective products. 406 F.2d at 862; 406 F.2d at 446; 210 Va. at 13, 168 S.E.2d at
259. Thus, the courts reasoned, that while the statute of limitations for the property
damage causes would begin to run at the date of sales, the statute of limitations for physical
harm to the plaintiffs should not begin to run until the dates of the plaintiffs' injuries. 406
F.2d at 862; 406 F.2d at 446; 210 Va. at 13, 168 S.E.2d at 259.
Virginia courts also have liberalized statute of limitations rules for professional
malpractice plaintiffs by creating a flat exception to the injury rule. The Virginia courts
have adopted a continuing treatment rule for statute of limitations periods in dental and
legal malpractice cases. See Fenton v. Danaceau, 220 Va. 1, 225 S.E.2d 349 (1979) (per
curiam); Farley v. Goode, 219 Va. 969, 252 S.E.2d 594 (1979); McCormick v. Romans & Gunn,
214 Va. 144, 198 S.E.2d 651 (1973). Under a continuing treatment rule, the statute of limita-
tions runs not from the time of injury, which the plaintiff may not discover for years, but
from the time of termination of the defendant's professional services to the plaintiff. 214 Va.
at 148, 198 S.E.2d at 654; see Zepkin, Virginia's Continuing Negligent Treatment Rule:
Farley v. Goode and Fenton v. Danaceau, 15 U. RICH. L. REv. 231 (1981) (discussion of
medical malpractice rule in Virginia).
" See text accompanying notes 82-86 supra.
"See text accompanying notes 89-90 supra.
94 See note 91 supra.
" See note 90 supra. A discovery rule would begin the statute's running either at the
time of symptoms or the time of diagnosis. Id. Both Locke's symptoms and his diagnosis of
mesothelioma occurred within the statutory two year period before he filed suit. 221 Va. at
954, 275 S.E.2d at 902.
See 221 Va. at 959, 275 S.E.2d at 905.
Id., 275 S.E.2d at 905.
See text accompanying notes 22-24 supra; text accompanying notes 148-51 infra.
221 Va. at 957, 275 S.E.2d at 904 (need for injury element before cause accrues); see
note 16 supra (elements of cause of action).
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all elements of a cause of action are present, a discovery rule promotes
even greater fairness to the plaintiff by insuring that the plaintiff is aware
of his injury before the statute of limitations bars his cause.
100
The practical effect of the theoretical differences is that the Locke
rule will not operate as broadly for plaintiffs' benefit as a discovery rule
would in many occupational disease cases. In order for the Locke rule to
achieve a result similar to that of a discovery rule, the symptoms of the
occupational disease must occur shortly after the disease first
develops."' The victim must be able to discover his disease through the
rapid onset of symptoms almost immediately after the disease comes
into existence."'0 If this pattern of sudden development of the disease
followed by immediate symptoms occurs, the date of development of the
disease that the Locke rule stresses will be close to the date the plaintiff
discovers the disease from symptoms or diagnosis. Thus, under either
the Locke rule or a discovery rule, the statute of limitations would begin
to run from approximately the same date.13 Locke's disease; mesothe-
lioma, follows the quick-development, immediate symptom pattern,"4
which accounts for the misleading impression from the Locke case that
the Locke rule and the discovery rule are essentially the same."'
Many occupational diseases, however, do not appear suddenly, ac-
companied by severe symptoms."6 Most common non-cancerous occupa-
tional pulmonary diseases like asbestosis and silicosis develop gradually
over a long period of time."7 Significant symptoms may not appear until
the later stages of the disease."8 Thus, several years normally separate
10 See note 10 & text accompanying notes 22-23 supra.
101 Two examples of diseases in which the Locke rule will operate like a discovery rule
are highly undifferentiated lung cancer and beryllium pneumonitis. See LAWYER'S MEDICAL
CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 13, §§ 33.39 & 33.55. In both diseases, the illness develops quite
rapidly, accompanied by- severe symptoms. Id. Thus, the development of the disease will oc-
cur immediately prior to the victim's discovery of the disease through symptoms. The
statute of limitations would run from the date of development of disease under Locke and
from the date of discovery under a discovery rule. Since the two dates nearly win coincide,
the two rules will operate alike.
102 See note 101 supra.
103 Id.
10 221 Va. at 954, 275 S.E.2d at 902; see note 41 supra (description of mesothelioma). In
mesothelioma cases, the tumor usually develops quickly after a 20-35 year latency period.
See LAWYER'S MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 13, § 33.53.
105 See text accompanying notes 82-95 supra.
100 See LAWYER'S MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 13, § 33.47. Many irritating
substances cause such a slow and gradual inflammatory reaction in the lungs that the
pulmonary disease may not manifest for several years after exposure. Id.
I7 See note 106 supra. Silicosis, a lung disease that the inhalation of silica dust causes,
is characterized by gradual development. LAWYER'S MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 13, §
33.48a. Asbestosis, scarring of the lungs caused by inhalation of asbestos dust, also develops
very slowly. Id. § 33.53. Other occupational diseases that develop gradually include talc
pneumoconiosis and byssinosis. Id. §§ 33.54 & 33.59a.
100 See LAWYER'S MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 13, §§ 33.48(a) & 33.53. Silicosis may
exist extensively throughout the lungs and produce no symptoms. LAWYER'S MEDICAL
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the initial development of the disease and the plaintiff's discovery of the
disease through symptoms."9 In cases in which the disease develops
gradually, the statute of limitations under Locke would run from the
date the disease first existed.110 Because the gradual development
disease plaintiff may not discover his disease for years after the disease
begins to develop,"' he often will not file suit within the statute of limita-
tions period. In contrast, the statute of limitations would not run under a
discovery rule until the plaintiff became aware of his injury, regardless of-
when the disease developed.'
A few unique diseases such as coal worker'spneumoconiosis (CWP),
which may develop in two distinct stages, also highlight the differences
between the Locke rule and a discovery rule."' The first stage of CWP is
simple CWP and is normally non-symptomatic.1 1 4 In some cases, simple
CWP develops at an unascertainable time into the second stage of the
disease, complex CWP, which involves severe symptoms and may be
fatal.1 Under the Locke rule, a court hearing a complex CWP case
would have to decide whether to use the development date of the simple
or of the complex form of the disease to trigger the statute of limita-
tions."' If the court used the development of the simple form of the
CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 13, § 33.48a. Asbestosis usually has progressed to an irreversible
stage by the time symptoms appear. Id. § 33.53. Chest x-rays do not show signs of asbestosis
until the disease is well established. Id.; see also Occupational Carcinogenesis, supra note 1,
at 119 (early diagnosis of cancer rare).
' See note 13 supra (development periods for non-cancerous occupational diseases ex-
tend up to 25 years).
221 Va. at 958-59, 275 S.E.2d at 905 (statute of limitations runs from date of develop-
ment of disease).
III See note 108 supra.
" See text accompanying note 10 supra.
1 See R. GRAY, 4A ATTORNEY'S TEXTBoOK OF MEDICINE (3d ed. 1981) §§ 205 B.21 & 205
B.22 [hereinafter cited as GRAY]. Coal workers' pneumoconiosis (CWP) is the best example
of a two-stage pulmonary disease. Medical authorities divide CWP into two distinct forms of
a pneumoconiosis (dust-related lung disease), simple and complex. Id.
Another disease, byssinosis, also may change from a simple intermittent form to a
more serious permanent form over a period of time, although medical authorities do not for-
mally divide byssinosis into simple and complex categories. Id. § 205 E.20.
11 GRAY, supra note 113, § 205 B.21.
111 Id., § 205 B.22.
1 Simple CWP and complex CWP are similar forms of pneumoconiosis, but medical
commentators often treat them as separate diseases. GRAY, supra note 113, §§ 205 B.21 &
205 B.22. Simple CWP and complex CWP have entirely different symptoms and prognoses.
I& Since complex CWP has severe symptoms and consequences, and simple CWP usually
has no symptoms, complex CWP probably would be the subject of an occupational disease
plaintiff's suit rather than simple CWP. See id. A court using the Locke manifestation rule
will have to decide if the two diseases are so similar that the court should use the date of
development of the simple CWP to trigger the statute of limitations. Use of non-
symptomatic simple CWP to trigger the limitations statute probably would bar most oc-
cupational disease plaintiffs. See id. If the court decides the diseases are not sufficiently
related to use the date of development of simple CWP as manifestation of the injury, the
court will have to use the development date of complex CWP, which is difficult to ascertain.
Id
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disease to trigger the statute, the plaintiff would be barred from suit if
he did not bring the action until symptoms appeared-in the second stage
of the disease.117 If the court used the development date of the complex
CWP, the plaintiff might be aware of his disease in time to maintain a
suit since severe symptoms usually accompany complex CWP."' Under a
discovery rule, the statute of limitations would run from the date the
plaintiff discovered the pneumoconiosis, regardless of when the two
stages of the disease developed."' Thus, the difference in results from
the application of the Locke rule and a discovery rule to several types of
occupational diseases refutes the Locke defendants' charges that the
Locke court in effect adopted a disguised discovery rule.2
The difference in focal points that leads to the dissimilarity of the
two rules makes a discovery rule preferable to the Locke rule in both
operation and result. The focus of the Locke rule on when the plaintiff
contracted the occupational disease... results in a heavy dependence
upon complex medical testimony concerning the time the disease de-
veloped.1" Since many occupational diseases develop over a long-period
of time, the medical expert will have to exercise his own judgment in
determining when the disease first developed." The potential result in a
case in which the medical evidence is not clear, as in Locke, is a battle of
medical experts, each opining a different date for the start of the
disease. 24 A judge and jury, operating without the benefit of detailed
medical knowledge of occupational diseases, will have difficulty
assimilating the evidence to determine precisely when the disease
developed and, thus, whether the plaintiff filed a timely suit."
Ii? See note 116 supra.
118 Id.
"' See note 10 supra. Under a discovery rule, the peculiar development of CWP would
be irrelevant. See text accompanying note 113 supra. The statute of limitations would begin
to run when the plaintiff discovered his disease through symptoms or diagnosis, which
would probably be some time after complicated CWP occurred. See note 116 supra.
A problem might arise in the application of a discovery rule to CWP in the situation in
which a plaintiff discovered he had simple CWP, did not sue, contracted complex CWP, and
then sued. The court would have to decide whether the plaintiff discovered his injury and,
thus, should have sued when he discovered the simple CWP even though the complex CWP
might never have developed. See GRAY, supra note 113, §§ 205 B.21 & 205 B.22. Because
simple CWP usually has no symptoms, however, victims are unlikely to discover CWP until
the complex form develops. Id.
1. See notes 82-87 supra.
' 221 Va. at 959, 275 S.E.2d at 905.
I ld. at 958, 275 S.E.2d at 905 (time of hurt to be established by competent medical
evidence pinpointing date of development of disease within reasonable degree of medical
certainty).
123 See text accompanying note 13 supra.
12, See Asbestos Litigation, supra note 18, at 82. Doctors cannot determine with cer-
tainty the date asbestos fibers damage the body. Id.
11 Too much reliance by a jury on medical testimony can encroach on the jury's fact
finding function. Cf. C. FRIEND, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN VIRGINIA 389 (1977) (how much
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In contrast, a rule that stresses the date of the plaintiff's discovery
of his injury eliminates emphasis on. confusing medical evidence that
varies with the type of disease.126 In a discovery rule jurisdiction, there-
fore, the testimony at trial concerning the date the plaintiff discovered
his disease probably will be factual and straightforward. The plaintiff
probably would testify about the date he noticed symptoms or sought
medical help, or a physician would testify about the date of the medical
exam or diagnosis.'- A problem with the discovery rule develops,
however, in jurisdictions in which the statute-triggering event is when
the plaintiff discovered or "should have discovered" his injury. The
phrase "should have discovered" is meant to bar non-diligent plaintiffs
who ignore symptoms or do not seek medical advice in time to file suit
against possible wrongdoers.'2 The phrase, however, can create a dif-
ficult factual judgment for a court or jury. The objective "should have
discovered" standard forces the trier of fact to set a specific date when
the plaintiffs symptoms became severe enough that he should have
sought medical help.1" The advantage of even an objective discovery
rule, however,. is that the judge and jury can use common sense or ex-
perience to make the judgment and do not need the extensive medical
knowledge about occupational diseases that judges and juries applying
the Locke rule will require."'
In addition to the drawbacks in regard to dependence on medical
testimony, the Locke rule may lead to less uniform or equitable results
in occupational disease cases than would a discovery rule. The Locke
rule's emphasis on the date the disease develops is likely to bar many oc-
cupational disease plaintiffs since medical evidence may indicate the
disease developed long before symptoms occurred."3 ' Thus, the type of
disease rather than a lack of diligence may bar plaintiffs from suit. 32 The
medical expert should be able to testify at trial about ultimate fact in question). Jurors are
supposed to accept or reject expert testimony as they see fit. Id. Decisions on the accept-
ance or rejection of testimony are difficult when complex medical testimony is involved. Id.
1" Because the date the plaintiff developed his disease is unimportant in discovery rule
jurisdictions, complex medical testimony is not necessary. See text acompanying note 10
supra.
I See, e.g., Kariala v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 523 F.2d 155, 156 (8th Cir. 1975)
(plaintiff testified about dates of symptoms and diagnosis); Harig v. Johns-Manville Prod.
Corp., 284 Md. 70, 72-73, 394 A.2d 299, 301 (1978) (plaintiff testified about dates of symp-
toms).
1 See PROSSER, supra note 1, at 144 (standard for determining when plaintiff "should
have discovered" his injury is reasonable diligence in obtaining medical advice).
' See California's Discovery Exceptions, supra note 29, at 116. One criticism of an ob-
jective discovery rule is that the rule creates an "unmanageable" decision for the trier of
fact about whether the plaintiff discovered his injury within a reasonable time. Id.; see note
29 supra.
See text accompanying note 125 supra.
"' See text accompanying notes 106-12 supra.
1 See text accompanying notes 101-20 supra. If symptoms appear quickly after the
development of the disease and the plaintiff diligently files suit, the statute of limitations
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effect of Locke, therefore, could be to favor certain occupational disease
victims, such as those with sudden disease development and immediate
symptoms, over others with gradual development diseases. 3
In contrast, a discovery rule distinguishes plaintiffs on the basis of
their diligence rather than their disease." Differences among diseases
in regard to when the disease develops in relation to when symptoms ap-
pear, which are critical under the Locke rule,"5 are irrelevant under a
discovery rule. 8' Plaintiffs in discovery rule jurisdictions would have the
benefit of a uniform statute of limitations standard based on their
diligence, rather than on events that they cannot control, such as when
the disease developed."
37
In view of the problems with the Locke rule, such as the heavy
dependence on medical testimony"8 and the emphasis on the nature of
the plaintiff's disease,"9 the rule's viability as a fair alternative to a
discovery rule in injury rule jurisdictions is doubtful. The Locke rule's
arbitrary emphasis on the time the plaintiff developed his disease,4 '
rather than on the degree of the plaintiffs diligence,"' may create more
problems in Virginia occupational disease cases than it solves.'' Admit-
tedly; the Locke rule is preferable to an exposure definition of injury for
will not bar his claim. See text accompanying notes 101-05 supra. If the plaintiffs symptoms
do not occur until long after the disease exists, however, the Locke rule will bar the suit
because the plaintiff will not be aware of his cause in time to file an action. See text accom-
panying notes 106-12 supra.
"' See text accompanying notes 101-20 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 22-29 supra.
1 See text accompanying notes 101-20 supra.
'N See text accompanying notes 112 & 119 supra.
13 See text accompanying notes 22-29 supra. The one factor that could create an excep-
tion to the idea that all diligent discovery rule plaintiffs will be allowed to maintain suit is a
faulty diagnosis. See P. BARTH, WORKER'S COMPENSATION AND WORK RELATED ILLNESSES AND
DISEASES 124 (1980) [hereinafter referred to as BARTH]. Most discovery rules hold a plaintiff
to be aware of his injury at the time he experiences symptoms or receives a diagnosis, even
if his condition has been misdiagnosed. Id. The statute of limitations begins to run from the
date of awareness of injury. Id.; see 221 Va. at 954, 275 S.E.2d at 902 (Locke's condition was
initially misdiagnosed); GRAY, supra note 113, § 205 C.20 (mesothelioma is easily misdiagnos-
ed as metastatic growth from earlier undetected cancer). Thus a discovery rule statute of
limitations may bar the plaintiff even though, because of a misdiagnosis of the nature of the
disease, he is not aware that he has a possible cause of action. BARTH, supra, at 124. Most
doctors, however, would connect the possible causal link between lung diseases and the
nature of plaintiff's employment. See GRAY, supra note 113, § 205 C.40. Some jurisdictions
have solved the problem of faulty diagnoses by not beginning the statute of limitations until
the plaintiff is aware of the occupational nature of his injury. See note 29 supra.
1 See text accompanying notes 122-25 supra.
"3 See text accompanying notes 101-20 supra.
221 Va. at 959, 275 S.E.2d at 905.
" See text accompanying notes 133-39 supra.
112 See text accompanying notes 121-25 & 131-33 supra (problems with the Locke rule
include possible confusion of juries because of medical testimony and non-uniform results
based on type of disease).
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both plaintiffs and defendants.14 Under an exposure rule, the plaintiff
may have to file suit before he knows he has contracted a disease and
thus would face tremendous proof of damages problems in court.14 On
the other hand, an exposure rule could allow a plaintiff to recover unfairly
from a defendant if the plaintiff discovers his disease, but continues
working and does not file suit until years later when he leaves his job
and suffers his last exposure to the harmful substance.1 5 Although the
plaintiff-oriented Locke rule146 is preferable to an exposure rule that can
lead to unfair results for both plaintiffs and defendants, the Locke rule
cannot produce the consistently equitable results for the plaintiff that a
discovery rule could yield because of the Locke rule's undesirable focus
on the date the plaintiff's disease developed. 47
Considering the flaws in the exposure rule and Locke rule alter-
natives, the legislatures in negligent act and injury rule jurisdictions,
including Virginia, should adopt a discovery rule that focuses on the
plaintiff's diligence in order to deal with the increasing numbers of oc-
cupational disease cases.4 1 Since potentially harmful substances like
asbestos are necessary in our industrial system, and since workers must
handle such substances, state legislatures should fashion a means of
shifting the pecuniary risk of harm of negligent manufacturers that ex-
pose workers to injurious substances without adequate protection or
warning. The only way to insure allocation of risk to the negligent
manufacturers on a case by case basis is to allow litigation on the merits
between the injured victim and the accused manufacturer. In turn, the
only way to insure deserving plaintiffs uniform and consistent accessibil-
ity to a trial on the merits is to adopt a diligence-based discovery rule.'
DEBORAH HUTCHINS COMBS
See text accompanying notes 144-45 infra.
1" See text accompanying note 21 supra.
'"See note 21 supra.
'" See text accompanying notes 82-94 supra.
... See text accompanying notes 131-37 supra.
'" See text accompanying notes 121-37 supra; see note 28 supra.
See notes 26 & 28 supra.
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